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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Developing sound and effective environmental protection inherently 
requires an infusion of economic thought into the development and analysis 
of environmental law.  Principles of economic efficiency and growth are not 
mutually exclusive from environmental health.  Indeed, economics-based 
environmentalism has the capacity to synergize nature’s adaptability, 
resilience, and spontaneity with those same qualities in markets, private 
ordering, and individual decision-making.   
Because of these characteristics, economic approaches have 
substantial comparative advantages over the static and constrained state-
based interventionist alternatives, and as such we should develop a 
presumption in favor of the former and against the latter when developing the 
next generation of environmental rules. This brief symposium Essay defends 
these basic propositions.  By its end, this Essay aims to show, at the very 
least, that those who do not work to understand and consider the role of 
economics in the development of environmental law and policy do so at the 
earth’s peril, let alone to the detriment of their own arguments.   
This symposium Essay is designed to look briefly at what economics, 
including its companion legal discipline “law and economics,” can teach us 
about the subject “Environmental Law 4.0: Adaptive and Resilient”1 – i.e. 
what role can economics play in evaluating the appropriate responsive 
regulatory design to the challenges we face as we approach a so-called 
“fourth generation” of environmental law.  One aim of this Essay is to use the 
tools of economic analysis and theory to explain some of the basic challenges 
to the implementation of these adaptive approaches.  A separate aim is to 
explain some of the possibilities for enhanced environmental protection and 
the achievement of environmental goals through embracing economics and 
the implementation of economically friendly approaches that incidentally 
provide for more effective means of protection. 
                                                 
1
 This Essay is adapted from remarks made at the Journal of Environmental & 
Sustainability Law’s 2014 Symposium, “Environmental Law 4.0: Adaptive and Resilient,” at 
the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri, on February 14, 2014. 
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To a substantial extent, this Essay is intended to only introduce 
economic themes related to environmental law and sketch what role 
economic analysis might play in the emerging generation of environmental 
law.  It will not be a full blown exposition of the merits of economics-based 
environmental approaches, and those looking for a more detailed analysis are 
encouraged to study the literature further.   
This Essay will take two approaches.  One is grounded in the 
normative side of law and economics, where there is a study of the preference 
for the injection of economic principles, including efficiency, into the proper 
or best formulation of rules.  The second approach in this Essay will be 
generated from the modes of positive analysis in law and economics, where 
the purpose of the analysis is principally to describe – using economic 
concepts and principles – the behavior of lawmakers, institutions, and interest 
groups; the predicted content of rules; and the operation of law and legal 
systems. 
Part II will briefly define and summarize the four generations of 
environmental law discussed in this Essay.  Part III will focus on the 
characteristics and merits of creating rules and organizing regulatory 
structures based on economic principles, ideas, and approaches.  Economics 
should play a role in generating rules and should also be a lens by which we 
can criticize the rules generated and the processes behind them.  I hope that 
we can relieve ourselves of the constraints imposed by those visions of 
environmental gains that can see only governmental and coercive means of 
achieving such gains.  Part IV will sketch the contours of a proposal to ensure 
greater economic consideration in the formulation of environmental law and 
policy.  If we were to develop a requirement that governmental agencies must 
prove market failure before proceeding to more prescriptive or interventionist 
alternatives, economics-based environmental lawmaking might get a chance 
to prove itself.  Finally, Part V shifts gears into the practical realities of any 
reform efforts, economics-based or otherwise.  Applying insights from public 
choice and bureaucracy theories in particular, it will explain some of the 
inherent hurdles to reform evident in our political and regulatory systems.  
So, Parts III and IV focus on the contention that economics should be a 
substantial part of the calculus wherever decisions are being made, and Part 
V explains that the law and economics’ lessons regarding the realities of law 
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creation and the operation of political institutions make any decisions made 
in such institutions fraught with danger and identifies institutional 
impediments to finding ideal environmental solutions.  
As I move forward, I will not necessarily advocate in this present 
Essay that there be a complete reversion away from the state as a leader in 
developing policies or priorities for environmental protection.  I am, 
however, not conceding that a strong state role in managing toward achieving 
these priorities will be necessary.  For now, this Essay is just about small 
steps, moving economics to a more recognized position in the polycentric 
analysis of environmental law.     
There is a need for economists and environmentalists to discourse on 
the mutually shared concerns for environmental protection and the next 
generational approach to achieve it.  The importance of cross-disciplinary 
exchange cannot be overstated.  Too often, economics and environmental law 
exist in their own separate silos, barely able to see the value of each other’s 
intellectual grains or able to evaluate when their grains should mix.  Dr. Matt 
Ridley, author of The Rational Optimist,
2
 made the point well when he 
recently stated that:  “Economics could learn something from Charles Darwin 
and ecology could evolve from revisiting Adam Smith.”3  Ridley continued 
that “Charles Darwin read Smith, so there is an ancestral connection between 
the two fields: they both stress the emergence of phenomena rather than their 
direction from above. And, there is much activity in evolutionary biology and 
ecology that is parallel to what is occurring in economics and vice versa.”4 
Indeed, he concludes that “Nobel laureate F. A. Hayek knew this and went 
across to evolution to pinch ideas, so there is fruitful dialogue between 
ecology and economics and plenty of room for more.”5  These are very 
important reminders.  We must frequently fertilize that fruitful dialogue.  We 
                                                 
2
 MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST: HOW PROSPERITY EVOLVES (2010). 
3
 Matt Ridley, Ecology or Economics: Which has done more for our environmental 
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II.  FOUR GENERATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
This Essay is focused on the so-called “fourth” or current and 
emerging generation of environmental law.  For purposes of this Essay, I 
have chosen one vision of the fourth generation of environmental law – 
largely represented by the work of Professor Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold 
and Professor Lance Gunderson
7
 – against which to explore the comparative 
benefits and prudence of injecting economic analysis into the evaluation of 
best mechanisms and practices to accomplish shared environmental goals.  
To understand the fourth generation, I will very briefly identify the first three 
generations.  Again, for ease of discussion, I will largely focus on the 
qualities given to each generation as identified by Arnold and Gunderson.   
A lot has happened in the last 45 years when it comes to the field of 
environmental law.  As Richard Epstein once noted, “[e]nvironmental 
protection was not a distinct field of law before 1970,” but “[s]ince that time 
it has become a growth industry.”8  Indeed, a review of the usage of 
“environmental law” as a term – or even “environmentalism” and 
                                                 
6
 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 6 (rev’d 
ed. 2001) (“elements of free market environmentalism – self-interest, information, and 
process – also characterize the interaction of organisms in nature.”). 
7
 For the articles upon which I have based this summary and formulated my responsive 
comments, see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law & 
Resilience, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10426 (2013); Craig Anthony (Tony) 
Arnold, Fourth Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771 (2011).  The choice to focus on this work is, in part, 
because the insights within it are at the forefront of the current environmental law literature.  
The concentration on this work to the exclusion of some others, however, is driven by the 
fact that Professor Arnold was the keynote speaker at the symposium for which this Essay 
was generated, making his work the logical reference point for an essay of this length.   See 
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Environmental Law, Episode IV: A New Hope?: Can 
Environmental Law Adapt for Resilient Communities and Ecosystems?, 21 J. ENVTL. & 
SUSTAINABILITY L. 1 (2014).  
8
 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 275 (1995). 
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“environmentalist” for that matter – reveals the currency of these terms 
across this short period of time. 
To appreciate the evolution of the fields discussed in this Essay, I will 
turn briefly to the results from Google’s N-gram function9 – which has been 
described as “the first tool of its kind, capable of precisely and rapidly 
quantifying cultural trends based on massive quantities of data.”10   This tool 
enables users “to examine the frequency of words . . . or phrases . . . in books 
over time.”11  When conducting a search, the database accesses “over 5.2 
million books: ~4% of all books ever published.”12  The results provide an 
interesting picture, at least for discussion purposes, on the usage of particular 
words and phrases (although it admittedly has some inherent limitations and 
presents only incomplete raw data).
13
   
                                                 
9
 Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited June 9, 
2014) [hereinafter Google Labs Ngram Viewer], (based on the model and database 
developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, 
Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale 
Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez 
Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 
SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176), available at  
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2010/12/15/science.1199644 (12/16/2010)).  
10
Google Labs Ngram Viewer, CULTUROMICS, http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/A-
users-guide-to-culturomics (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).  See also Michel et al., supra note 9, 
at 176 (describing the database and related data collection tool). 
11




 John Bohannon, Google Opens Books to New Cultural Studies, SCIENCE, Dec. 17, 
2010, at 1600 (describing the Ngram project and its initial critics).  Peer review is as of yet 
limited on this relatively new tool, yet even the creators warn, “[b]asically, if you’re going to 
use this corpus for scientific purposes, you’ll need to do careful controls to make sure it can 
support your application. Like with any other piece of evidence about the human past, the 
challenge with culturomic trajectories lie in their interpretation.”  Culturomics Website 
(operated by some of the creators), available at http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/A-
users-guide-to-culturomics.  Suggestions for controls are available in the main paper 
supporting the application.  See also Michel et al., supra note 9, at 181.  “Culturomic results 
are a new type of evidence in the humanities.  As with fossils of ancient creatures, the 
challenge of culturomics lies in the interpretation of this evidence.”  Id. (giving a few 
example searches with interpretations). 
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Below, I have reprinted the N-gram results for several terms relevant 
to our discussion.  The graph represents the usage of the terms or phrases 
environmentalism, environmentalist, environmental law, law and economics, 
and free market environmentalism over the 1950 to 2008 (last available date 
in the program) time period: 
TABLE 1: 
GOOGLE LABS BOOKS N-GRAM VIEWER 
GRAPH “ENVIRONMENTALISM”, “ENVIRONMENTALIST”, 
“ENVIRONMENTAL LAW”, “LAW AND ECONOMICS”, AND “FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM” FROM 1950 TO 2008  
FROM THE CORPUS OF ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3 
 
Source: GOOGLE BOOKS N-GRAM VIEWER, 
http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited June 9, 2014) 
(based on the model and database developed by Jean-
Baptiste Michel*, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, 
Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The 
Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan 
Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin 
A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden*. Quantitative 
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books. 
SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176). 
Each line represents the unigram for these terms and phrases.  The y-
axis shows what percentage of all the unigrams contained in Google’s sample 
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of books written in English include the phrase or term tested.  “Usage 
frequency is computed by dividing the number of instances of the N-gram in 
a given year by the total number of words in the corpus in that year.”14  
Smoothing allows for a consideration of the trends as a moving average and 
can be adjusted for any search.
15
 
All of these terms and phrases have only appeared in a relatively 
small percentage of the overall books in Google’s digitized collection, but 
Table 1 certainly shows both a notable frequency and interesting trends in 
usage.  Obviously, this is just a glimpse at some raw data on word usage, but 
it helps tell part of the story regarding the relative role of each of these terms, 
phrases, and fields in our legal and policy discussion across the past several 
decades.  The general rise across the first several graphed decades is 
consistent with the generational story discussed below for environmental law, 
environmentalism, and environmentalists. The general rise during those early 
decades also tracks the origin and rise of law and economics discussion in the 
literature.
16
   Free market environmentalism has never been en vogue,
17
 
shown in Table 1 where that phrase barely registers in the frequency results. 
                                                 
14
 See Michel et al., supra note 9, at 181.  The Google Ngram data is “normalize[d] by 
the number of books published in each year.”  What’s All This Do?, GOOGLE BOOKS, 
http://books.google.com/ngrams/info  (last visited June 9, 2014). 
15
 Google Books describes “smoothing” as follows: 
Often trends become more apparent when data is viewed as a moving 
average. A smoothing of 1 means that the data shown for 1950 will be an 
average of the raw count for 1950 plus 1 value on either wide: (“count for 
1949” + “count for 1950” + “count for 1951”), divided by 3.  So a smoothing 
of 10 means that 21 values will be averaged: 10 on either side, plus the target 
value in the center of them.  At the left and right edges of the graph, fewer 
values are averaged.  With a smoothing of 3, the leftmost value (pretend it’s 
the year 1950) will be calculated as (“count for 1950” + “count for 1951” + 
“count for 1952” + “count for 1953”), divided by 4. 
What’s All This Do?, supra note 14.  In addition to providing the graphed results, 
searches for terms and phrases also produce hyperlinks appearing below the graph, allowing 
one to browse through the books available that contributed to the data set.  Id. (“Below the 
graph, we show ‘interesting’ year ranges for your query terms. Clicking on those will submit 
your query directly to Google Books.”). 
16
 Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 26-30 (1989) 
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The slight drop in usage in the 2000’s for all of the terms graphed 
above suggests that the 1990s may have represented a high point in the 
prevalence of environmental-talk in the public discourse.   I will leave for 
another day whether there are any meaningful observations to draw from that 
downward slope.   
But, what we do know is that across the past 40 or 50 years, 
environmental law has generally grown in scope and prevalence within legal 
debates.  Across that time, it has also seen some rather significant shifts in its 
focus and has been characterized by different types of regulatory approach.
18
  
These changes have inspired some to talk about environmental law in terms 
of “generations,” collecting and categorizing generalizable traits for specific 
periods of regulatory and philosophical structuring for the legal approach to 
environmental concerns. 
None of these “generations” necessarily replaced what had come 
before; for the most part, each generation has built something new atop the 
old – although sometimes adjusting priorities and approaches in ways that 
displaced, discarded, or at least learned from the successes and failures of its 
predecessor.
19
  The first generation of environmental law – emerging in the 
late 1960s and 1970s – largely includes features that focused on “command-
and-control regulation, technology-based standards, and rule-of law 
litigation,” along with other pollution prevention techniques20 – what I will 
call primarily “hard-” or “state-based, interventionist” methods.  The second 
generation attempted to move away from rigidity and high cost regulation to 
                                                                                                                         
(examining the historical growth of law and economics movement and its increasing 
influence especially from the 1970s through the present in legal academic literature).  See 
also Ejan MacKaay, The History of Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1996). 
17
 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 6, at 1 (lamenting the lack of support even from 
“conservatives” for the ideas of free market environmentalism). 
18
 See generally Denis Binder, Looking Back to the Future: A Curmudgeon’s Guide to 
the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 993 (2013) (surveying and analyzing 
the history of environmental law, particularly the last 40 years).  
19
 Arnold, supra note 7, at 773, 792. 
20
 Id. at 790. 
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a greater sensitivity to cost and economic concern
21
 and included some push 
for what I will call “soft intervention.”  The third generation focused on new 
processes and expanded the scope of environmental concerns and our 
understanding of environmental sensitivities
22
 – what I will call a broadened 
scope of permissible intervention and a wider view of justifications for 
environmental law.   
The fourth generation is the “what’s next generation” for 
environmental law.  The remainder of this part will focus on some of Arnold 
and Gunderson’s analysis and predictions regarding the substantive contours 
of the emerging environmental legal landscape.  What follows will be only a 
very brief summary of some of the themes that Arnold and Gunderson 
highlight as likely characteristics of the emerging generation of 
environmental law, so I encourage readers to turn to the cited works for 
greater detail and nuance, as well as to appreciate the full texture to each of 
these observations.   
Arnold and Gunderson’s work explaining these attributes is extensive 
and this brief essay can hardly claim to provide an adequate summary for 
completely understanding their work.  What follows will, however, be a 
sufficient summary for this Essay’s purposes.  Some of the analysis later in 
this Essay, regarding the utility of greater infusion of economic principles 
into the development of environmental law, will refer back to this vision of 
the fourth generation to explain how economic principles can fit within it. 
Among the themes examined in the fourth generation, Arnold and 
Gunderson focus on the resilience of environmental systems, recognizing that 
there is an “evolution of interconnected social, legal, and ecological systems 
that are complex, dynamic, and adaptive.”23  Within this evolution, 
adaptability is in demand and must emerge as a key feature of fourth 
generation environmental law.
24
  Much of the current research on the future 
of environmental law is focused not on whether the law will adapt, taking 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 791. 
22
 Id. at 791-92. 
23
 Id. at 773. 
24
 Id. (“environmental law is undergoing pressure to adapt”). 
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that as a given, but instead is focused on how the law will adapt.
25
  To be 
truly responsive to the demand for new adaptive approaches, the emerging 
legal systems will need flexibility.
26
    Among the likely characteristics of the 
fourth generation of environmental law will be a rejection of fragmentation 
and unimodal (or one-size-fits-all) approaches
27
 in favor of “integrationist 
multimodality.”28  This, Arnold describes as: 
The use of multiple modes or methods in 
environmental protection can occur in at least three different 
ways. Multimodality may involve the use of multiple 
categories of policy instruments, such as command-and-
control regulation, tort liability, public education, and market 
incentives. Multimodality can also describe the use of more 
than one specific tool or mechanism for environmental 
protection. . . . Finally, multimodality might refer to the use 
of multiple institutions, organizations, groups, or authoritative 
entities to engage in environmental protection.”29  
The point is to integrate regulatory approaches using the best loosely-
connected tools in the best combination at the right times so as to provide a 
way that “offer[s] coordination and synergy.”30   New approaches in this 
vision of the emerging system will not be “merely additive or competitive,” 
but instead “will be a facilitative and transformative force.”31 This loose 
integration of multi-modal approaches allows the next generation of adaptive 
environmental law to be polycentric in nature, drawing on a variety of 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 792-93.  
26
 Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 10427 (“Rapid and often nonlinear 
transformations in ecosystems and social systems, though, require social institutions – 
including legal institutions – that are flexible and adaptive to these types of change”).  
27
 Id. at 10434 (describing integrationist multimodality and the “toolbox approach, 
facilitating multiple actors’ selection from among a variety of instruments, methods, and 
tools to respond to complex problems” with “[l]oose connections or networks”). 
28
 Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 7, at 792-97. 
29
 Arnold, supra note 7, at 794 (emphasis added). 
30
 Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 10434. 
31
 Arnold, supra note 7, at 775. 
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different tools in the solutions’ set to work together to find optimal 
outcomes.
32
   
Note that Arnold and Gunderson list things like tort liability (a private 
ordering method) and market incentives as part of the toolbox.  Nonetheless, 
they retain at the outset an equally-weighted place for command-and-control 
regulation as part of what those authors are defining as a polycentric mix.  As 
will be discussed in the next Parts, we should favor a fourth generation that 
emerges along these lines but with greater emphasis on the economic, private 
ordering, and market approaches.  I contend that market and other 
economics-based approaches should receive priority status, where those tools 
are utilized first and only if those methods objectively fail would the state 
move in to use more interventionist parts of the toolbox.  
There may be a greater opportunity for economics to play a role in the 
fourth generation of environmental law especially if it has as one of its 
primary characteristics the embracing of adaptivity in rule development.  
Perhaps economics will be more welcome in the conversation if that is the 
case and if policymakers can begin to see the synergy between economics 
and optimal adaptation techniques.  As defined, the fourth generation is 
unlike the first generation, which rested on ideas that economics was the 
disease.  Also, while the second generation is sometimes characterized as the 
point where economics was indeed embraced in environmental policy, many 
of these economics-based reforms were surface level and designed to inform 
rather than actually mandate or induce economically friendly outcomes or 
alternatives.   
The mirage of these second generation reforms is also perhaps their 
most dangerous characteristic.  The existence of cost-benefit analyses, small 
business analysis, and other such procedural “check the box” requirements 
create an inaccurate perception that economics is already being effectively 
taken into account.  That belief creates a false complacency, thereby pushing 
out support for more robust economic environmental approaches.  Few 
existing laws require that economic justifications be established prior to 
                                                 
32
 Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 10432 (“Adaptive law is polycentric, utilizing 
multimodal and multiscalar responses to problems that are loosely integrated.”). 
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authorizing state interventionist action.  Rather than rest on these rather 
toothless means of occasionally taking economics into account, perhaps we 
should employ or, indeed, require that more economics-based regulatory 
models be implemented.
33
  What is needed is a true infusion of economic 
principles as a primary driving force in the creation of the next generation of 
environmental rules. 
There is a need to aim for adaptability in environmental law.  Indeed, 
it should receive substantial emphasis.  My concern, as will be developed in 
more detail in the next Part, is with the methods employed to achieve that 
adaptability.  Environmentalism can be set in its ways and invested in certain 
approaches.
34
  In some ways, I fear that environmental advocates may be 
afraid of getting their narrative and philosophy a little messy by accepting 
other-modal alternatives to save the earth.  Perhaps advocates of economic 
approaches are also a little afraid of getting their economic cloaks soiled and 
need to overcome that fear by listening to the claims of traditional 
environmentalism too.  These are critiques that should be taken seriously if 
an actual, constructive dialogue is to occur between the fields.   
This fourth generation, as it has been framed here, seems to, perhaps, 
invite more discussion of economic principles into environmental policy than 
the previous three generations.  After all, a multi-modal, polycentric 
approach looks to a diverse set of inputs, including those generated out of 
economic ideas.  Part of my exercise in the next Parts of this Essay will be to 
justify economics having a seat at the table of any fourth generation 
discussions and designs of policy.  I will, at times, also push the boundaries 
of that invitation to that discursive dinner when I make the claim that, once 
invited, economics should perhaps become the host, the chef, the menu-
setter, and the server of the fourth generation policy meal. 
                                                 
33
 See infra Part IV. 
34
 See, e.g., M. Neil Browne, Kathleen Maloy, & Jessica Pici, The Struggle for the Self 
in Environmental Law: The Conversation Between Economists and Environmentalists, 18 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 335, 355-56 (2000/2001) (“Resistance to economic thinking is 
primarily responsible for the fascination among environmentalists with the idea of 
sustainable development.”). 
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There is no doubt that we have a better environment today than we 
had before environmental concerns became a focal point for governmental 
policy.  Over time, we have made improvements.  In part, state intervention 
has directed our attention and concerns toward the environment in important 
ways.  However, that partial credit for spurring environmental concern does 
not provide a basis for sticking with the state as the optimal means to achieve 
such ends.  Claimed interventionist success stories alone should not be a 
reason to rely on top-down governmental approaches in setting future policy.  
There certainly is not proof that a heavy governmental regulatory hand is the 
best option for the alleviation and prevention of environmental harm – or, at 
the very least, there is not proof that it is the best option in all cases.  In fact, 
as we approach a new generation of environmental law and policy, one of the 
key questions that policy makers should ask is whether environmental 
regulation as presently constituted, with its locus in governmental regulation, 
holds us back from optimal environmental protection.   
Is there room for greater environmental protection?  Absolutely.  Can 
we do more to protect the environment?  Of course.  The debate is over the 
comparative advantage of the means for such improvement. 
III. ECONOMICS-BASED ENVIRONMENTALISM 
One of the goals of this Essay is to set forth the proposition that 
environmental protection and economic concerns are not mutually exclusive.  
Economics-based environmentalism involves improving the environment but 
from a slightly different angle than the traditional approach that often first 
comes to mind where the necessity of governmental intervention is often 
presumed.  Much of what this Essay discusses applies to the fourth 
generation of environmental law but is not unique to it.  Having been left out 
of much of the discussion (or at least received less attention) in past 
generational developments, my hope is that these economic principles will 
resonate more in this emerging generation. 
There are a variety of mechanisms that could come into play in the 
economics-based approach to environmental law.  I will only briefly suggest 
a few of these to give a sense of the environmental possibilities from 
embracing economics in the fourth generation of environmental law. 
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On the normative side of economic analysis of environmental law and 
policy, economics-based environmentalism is concerned with how economics 
can actually influence the creation of legal rules, how we can achieve the 
optimal legal rules, or how we might otherwise infuse economic principles 
into the decision-making that chooses the rules.  That will be the focus of this 
Part. The positive-side, institutional analysis in this Essay focuses on what 
economics can teach us about the possibilities of actually achieving 
environmental reform – regardless of whether it be of the type that I propose 
from a normative economics-based preference or whether it is driven by any 
of a variety of alternative perspectives.  That will be the focus of final Part of 
this Essay.
35
  So, back to the normative-side analysis for now, where we will 
focus largely on how and why economics should be infused into the 
environmental discussion.   
Economics-based environmentalists contend that the advantages of 
using economic principles come from the benefits available in private 
ordering, markets, property rights, liability regimes, and incentive structures 
that will better protect the environment than alternative approaches based in 
state-centered interventionist, prescriptive rules that lack the adaptability and 
tailored effect of economics-based rules.  Economics-based environmentalists 
explain that environmental protection can be accomplished if the government 
sets rules that allow private markets to price resources, establishes 
enforceable rights in those resources, and allows individuals to freely trade 
such rights.
36
   
The economic approach also focuses on creating valuation of 
economic harms to aid compensation mechanisms that allow for the 
assessment of liabilities against wrongdoers and work as deterrents to 
                                                 
35
 See infra Part V. 
36
 See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the “integral role” that 
government has to play in market-based environmentalism in, for example, setting up and 
enforcing systems of property rights).  See also Fred L. Smith, Jr. & Kent Jeffreys, A Free-
Market Environmental Vision, in MARKET LIBERALISM: A PARADIGM FOR THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
397 (David Boaz & Edward H. Crane ed. 1993) (describing the government’s role in 
establishing and enforcing property rights and their relation to managing environmental 
resources). 




  Polluters should be made to pay, for example, 
through tort liabilities or perhaps through pollution tax systems.
38
   
To the extent that the state is unwilling to surrender substantial 
control to private actors and the market, economics-based environmentalism 
calls for the injection of these economic standards into the development of 
state-based regulatory law, hoping that those state laws will try to harness the 
economic ideas.  If the governmental actors take these ideas into account 
even when establishing interventionist or prescriptive rules, it might allow for 
their (imperfect, but relatively superior to the status quo) replication by, or 
mimicking in, the state-based regulatory form (to the extent such replication 
or mimicking is possible).  
Some Thoughts on Fit for Economics-Based Environmentalism Within 
the Fourth Generation Environmental Law Paradigm: Adaptive 
Approaches and Spontaneous Order 
As a general matter, if you want an adaptive and flexible approach to 
environmental law, economic tools best provide those attributes.  Arnold and 
Gunderson explain the necessity of developing an adaptive approach to 
environmental law in the fourth generation.
39
  Current environmental 
concerns are far too complex to understand and address in some type of 
unimodal approach.  The tunnel-vision, silo-like approach that has sometimes 
characterized past environmental law paradigms is insufficient to meet 
adaptive demands.  This call for adaptability should place economics at the 
forefront of the discussion. 
Arnold & Gunderson explain that some “problems may require quick 
and agile responses.”40  Market-oriented economic approaches best fit that 
                                                 
37
 See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 275-78 (2013) (discussing polluter pay principles). 
38
 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §13.5 at 396-97 (7
th
 ed. 2007) 
(discussing polluter pays and pollution tax principles). 
39
  Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 10437 (discussing the recognition of “the need 
for adaptive management, but also the need for express legal authority for administrative 
agencies and natural resource managers to use adaptive management methods”). 
40
 Id. at 10434. 
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need, rather than the clunky machinery of bureaucracies and legislatures.  
The bungling in government programs is a matter of bureaucratic apparatus 
but also psychology and ideology.  Political and regulatory systems are by 
their very nature resistant to adaptation and therefore inferior if your goal is 
to embrace enhanced adaptability.
41
 
Environmentalists too, along with environmental regulators, will 
often be resistant to a change of any kind because it is asking them to have 
faith and let go of some of the constant control that gives them a sense of 
security.  For the very same reasons, those holding on to a belief in the 
superiority of the traditional environmental law paradigm will be more likely 
to resist models of environmental law that allow adaptation on the ground 
and in the moment.   
Getting all stakeholders to agree to move toward any reform effort 
has intrinsic difficulties.  The status quo has biases in favor of unimodal 
regulation.
42
  We have people who are invested in the rules that they have 
helped design or have lobbied to create.   We have regulators who have 
developed expertise in existing rules and wish to capitalize on that expertise 
rather than have it devalued by replacing the existing regime of rules (for 
which those regulators have no special experience or developed skills that 
they can offer toward it). 
We can never count on the planners to replicate the flexibility of 
individualized private actors inside the private, self-ordering and self-
adjusting systems of markets and other economics-based sets of rules.  As 
Hayek has warned, “[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men 
how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.”43  
Planners plan.  Planners design.  Planners think it is possible to plan and 
design.  Planners become invested in their plans and designs and in their 
beliefs that they know what is best.  These characteristics do not fit well with 
an adaptive, flexible, and agile environmental law that is capable of regular 
                                                 
41
 See infra Part V. 
42
 Arnold, supra note 7, at 822-23. 
43
 F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 76 (W.W. Bartley, III 
ed. 1991). 
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adjustment.  State-based action is generally “slow and unable to respond to 
changing circumstances.”44  But a well-structured market-based system 
learns as it goes.  It adjusts automatically.  And it rejects any need for some 
initial “design” beyond setting up the basic architectural structure of 
identifiable rights and neutral enforcement systems.   
If you are on the ground in a management scheme designed to operate 
within and utilize economic forces, you can change things immediately.  You 
do not need to go through bureaucratic machines to get authorization.  The 
smooth and seamless adaptation that non-bureaucratic approaches can 
provide is, by definition, more capable of effecting adaptation than models 
that require state approval.   
The speed and agility with which economic systems can adapt is best 
explained as based in the existence of spontaneous order within 
unconstrained markets.  Spontaneous order – a cornerstone of economics-
based and market-based approaches – provides the optimal adaptability.45  
The essence of spontaneous order is that where there is an absence of hard 
control, things work themselves out in an efficient manner so long as the 
right incentives exist.  Inside such an “order-less order”, there is an ability to 
react instantaneously and spontaneously to both expected and unexpected 
events.  In the absence of planning, efficiencies emerge.  Each market 
participant acting in her own self-interest ultimately serves the greater 
good.
46
  In contrast, with the presence of planning and prescriptive rules, 
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 Smith & Jeffreys, supra note 36, at 395. 
45
 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 50, 35-52 (1973) (“It is because it was 
not dependent on organization but grew up as a spontaneous order that the structure of 
modern society has attained that degree of complexity which it possesses and which far 
exceeds any that could have been achieved by deliberate organization.”). 
46
 As Adam Smith described the related “invisible hand” concept:  
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own 
advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study 
of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer 
employment which is most advantageous to the society . . . . [H]e intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the 
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
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roadblocks to private experimentation regularly emerge while adjustment and 
adaptation to changing circumstances is impeded by rigid structures and 
commitments to a pre-set design and pre-determined order.   
If you have an objective in mind, set a goal, and set market forces 
loose, individuals will find on their own what the most effective and efficient 
“order” is to achieve such goals or objectives spontaneously and without the 
need for direction ex ante.
47
  This order is capable of adapting as it goes 
along and you get natural feedback loops
48
 – through the price system and 
other measures – rather than requiring them to be produced through some 
regulatory structure or command. 
Adaptive and integrationist approaches have their merits.  But the 
aims of these approaches are best served by non-interventionist alternatives.  
Markets and economic approaches have a comparative advantage in 
adaptability.  Markets are the most adaptive and flexible.  Markets are 
capable of making quick adjustments.  Markets foster tailored solutions. 
If you can indeed find the market solutions, then they are likely to 
have these characteristics.  I do not take on the ambitious task of defining all 
such market solutions in this Essay nor do I set forth a comprehensive plan 
for their implementation.  I also do not pretend that there will be easy 
answers to the logistics of infusing such market approaches into a state-
dominated regulatory field.  This brief Essay has a modest scope and will 
only provide a few examples of the options.  I invite the fourth generation 
architects, however, to take the characteristics and advantages of economics-
based environmentalism into account and work hard to find solutions that 
                                                                                                                         
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it.   
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, bk. IV, ch. 2, 397, 399 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1991) (1776).  See also Jan Narveson, 
The “Invisible Hand,” 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 201 (2003). 
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 SMITH, supra note 46, at 399. 
48
 Arnold and Gunderson stress the importance of feedback loops to a well-functioning 
adaptive system.  Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 10437-440 (“Feedback loops are 
essential to aiding decision-makers in assessing whether any particular decision or action is 
adaptive or maladaptive: to monitor, assess, learn from, and adapt to the action’s impacts.”). 
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draw on these comparative advantages of economics, the market, and private 
ordering.   
The topic of adaptive lawmaking and management is certainly one 
where there is an opportunity for a fruitful dialogue between the fields.  
Economics is about adaptation.  It is about flexibility, independent decision 
making and responding to changes as they emerge.    Because of these 
characteristics of economics, we should see great value in grounding many 
environmental decisions in an economics-oriented policy structure.   There 
should be a “weighted” approach to environmental decision-making where 
economics has a primary place in the development of adaptive environmental 
rules.  
The Danger of Crowding Out the Economic Approach and Its Adaptive 
Benefits When Implementing a Polycentric Structure 
One concern about the adaptive approach and even the polycentric 
approach, as Arnold and Gunderson describe it, is the possibility that it will 
crowd out market solutions.  If you start to believe that economics can play a 
significant role – perhaps even a primary role – in the formulation of 
environmental policy and law, then you should have concerns about a 
polycentric approach, which presupposes the existence of some governmental 
regulation.   
The mere existence of some federal, some state, some local, and some 
other governmental approaches will minimize the number of available market 
options.  The polycentric law as described in Arnold and Gunderson lacks 
safeguards against duplication and inefficient multijurisdictional and 
multifaceted approaches.  Furthermore, resources could be diverted so that 
there is not enough focus or leeway given to market experimentation or, more 
likely, some policy approaches will become more command-and-control 
dominated eliminating some of the possible options to take market 
approaches which may in fact be made unlawful or otherwise legally 
unavailable by the governmental components of the mix.  In a fully 
polycentric paradigm as described by Arnold and Gunderson, for example, 
markets and other economic options may be placed in an inferior position 
because they will be deprived of the open space they need to operate 
effectively.  Flexibility and the freedom to experiment without legal 
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constraints will be impaired if we insist on obtaining a full polycentric “mix” 
of authorities and approaches. 
Selected, Specific Themes and Features in Economics-Based 
Environmentalism 
The remaining portions of this Part are devoted to talking a bit more 
specifically about a few particular themes, characteristics, and features of 
some of the economic approaches that can be implemented to achieve 
environmental gains.  This is hardly an exhaustive treatment of the topic.  
Instead, a few economics-infused ideas related to environmental protection 
have been selected for discussion to give the reader a sense of the role for 
economic thought in the emerging generation of environmental law. 
Externalities 
I will start with some basics on the economic principles regarding the 
control of externalities and the importance of allocating property rights and 
liabilities for harms.  Many issues in environmental law can be boiled down 
to the control of negative externalities.
49
  Negative externalities occur when 
one uses her property and fails to carry the full burden of the costs of her 
action (yet usually has a monopoly on the benefits of her action).
50
  The 
negative consequences of using one’s property are not internalized.  
Externalities’ control is essentially the implementation of the maxim 
underlying the right to exclude – sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas – 
meaning that “each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor, . . . 
[which] is the rule by which every member or society must possess and enjoy 
                                                 
49
 HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR 
LAWYERS 25-26 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the efficiency costs of externalities). 
50
 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 348 (1967) (“‘Internalizing’ such effects refers to a process, usually a change in 
property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting 
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his property.”51  Each of us, in using our own property, has a duty to 
internalize the costs of our own actions.
52
   
Alternatively stated, we must respect others by not imposing negative 
externalities, while we can expect that others will be under a reciprocal 
obligation to treat us, and our property, the same.
53
  The freedom from 
negative externalities and the enforcement of the right to exclude lie at the 
heart of property law,
54
 and the economics of property law is often seeking 
means to incentivize the internalization of the costs of one’s actions.55   
Cutting and Cahoon provide a very useful example of the externality 
problem when discussing pollution.  When pollution exists, there are persons 
who generate pollutants (generators) and persons who receive negative 
externalities from such generation (receptors).
56
  In attempting to control the 
negative trans-boundary effects,
57
 the question becomes whether the law 
should hold generators liable to compensate receptors for any possible 
imposed harms.
58
  The primary question becomes whether we recognize 
systems of private enforcement like torts and the establishment of well-
defined property rights together with trading systems as sufficient to control 
against these negative externalities,
59
 or whether there are flaws in such 
private and market-based solutions that necessitate the existence of 
government, top-down intervention.   
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52
 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 655 (4th rev. ed. 
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 Id. at 348. 
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 Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights 
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 See Smith & Jeffreys, supra note 36, at 397. 
ECONOMICS-BASED ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
70
The law should embrace methods that encourage internalization of 
harms from one’s use of property.60  Economics-based environmentalism is 
possible when there are well-defined and enforceable property rights’ 
systems.  As Demsetz explains, “property rights specify how persons may be 
benefited or harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the 
actions taken by persons.”61  With such systems, it becomes easier to 
incentivize protection of resources, control against depletion of 





The property issues in economics-based environmental protection 
mechanisms include the identification of harm, traceability to its source, the 
allocation of property rights (including in environmental resources), liability 
and compensation regimes for bad acts, and free exchange and tradability of 
environmental property rights once allocated.
63
  We should develop and 
create property rights in environmental resources so as to provide a more 
effective means of protecting environmental concerns and to achieve a better 
allocation of resources in an environmentally positive way.   
Property rights and assignment of the same fit into the core of an 
economics-based environmentalism approach.  Secure and certain property 
rights facilitate investment in conservation.
64
  An economics-based pollution 
control system is possible if property rights can be identified and liabilities 
for harms imposed.
65
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 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 6, at 147. 
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Anderson and Leal have explained the utility of property rights 
toward incentivizing protection of environmental resources: 
It is useful to reiterate the importance of the evolution 
of property rights and the common law.  As clean water and 
air become more valuable, entrepreneurs have a greater 
incentive to define and enforce rights to the resources.  If we 
continue to subsidize the use of these resources and to 
subsidize the costs of disposal, however, entrepreneurs will 
not be getting the right signals. . . . There is no guarantee that 
property rights will evolve, but we should not stand in the 




One of the problems that has plagued the advocacy for market-based 
controls of resources like air and water, for example, has been the limits on 
(1) allocating property rights in such resources; and (2) identifying 
contributors to pollution of such resources, i.e. addressing the traceability 
problem.  As one set of market-oriented authors explained: 
In terms of applying a market solution to 
environmental problems, few areas are more troublesome 
than water pollution.  Because polluters are often difficult to 
identify and because rights to clean water are not vested in 
individuals or clearly specified organizations, the costs of 
garbage disposal into streams, lakes, or oceans can be easily 
passed on to others.  Under these circumstances, a free market 
solution to water pollution seems elusive.
67
 
Despite some of the problems associated with markets and the control 
of externalities, there is really no reason to presume that governments will be 
any better at overcoming the difficulties of traceability and otherwise be able 
to efficiently assess liability and manage risks of negative externalities.
68
  We 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 150. 
67
 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 6, at 138-39. 
68
 See Terry L. Anderson, Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes?, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 81 (2004) (explaining why there should not be a presumption that government 
 
ECONOMICS-BASED ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
72
should strive to find new and innovative ways to assign property rights in 
resources where no assignment has been made before and do so in a way that 
capitalizes on the incentive structures created when such rights are allocated.    
Take Advantage of Emerging Technology 
Increasingly, economic approaches can utilize new technologies to 
assist in the creation, allocation, and enforcement of private rights.  As 
Professor Jonathan Adler has contended, “[e]nhanced technologies and 
greater understanding of ecological conditions make it possible to conceive 
of property rights today where once they were the stuff of ecological 
fantasy.”69 
New technologies not only open up opportunities for new regulatory 
approaches, but also, some of the skepticism about the capability of market 
mechanisms to control for environmental harms is now being challenged as 
we develop technologies that can harness the market.  For example, new 
technologies are allowing us to better assign property rights to particular 
environmental values.
70
 New technologies can help us create more 
sophisticated property rights’ regimes and facilitate a more exacting 
allocation of rights in resources and more targeted injunction rights against 
pollutants.
71
  New technologies decrease traceability and causation problems 
in pollution that previously may have existed as impediments to private, tort-
based regulation of environmental harm.    
Property rights-based solutions may not be available for all 
environmental concerns, but it certainly should be possible to utilize them to 
a substantially greater degree in the fourth generation than we have before, 
especially as aided by new technologies.  If we can isolate rights to air and 
                                                                                                                         
regulation is the better approach to externality problems). 
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 Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice 
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 128-129 
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in different resources). 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1 
73 
water resources, for example, we can allocate the property rights in these 
resources and allow them to be tradable.
72
  The owners of the rights will have 
incentives to preserve their value, including maintaining the environmental 
character of the resource and bringing actions against those that would harm 
it. 
The Common Law, Compensation Methods, and Liability Systems 
We should use common law remedies to allocate responsibility to 
culpable private actors.
73
  This will involve the creation of more robust tort 
schemes.
74
  Utilizing and expanding existing nuisance and trespass doctrines 
and encouraging more experimentation in the use of common law remedies 
for environmental harms should be encouraged.
75
   
It will necessitate more sophisticated identification of wrongdoers and 
assessment of costs.  This more targeted liability allocation will better assign 
responsibility and make more sense than sweeping up all industry 
participants in one-size-fits-all regulation.  The creation of these polluter-
pays based compensation schemes would incentivize the internalization of 
harms and encourage individuals to take actions to avoid being held liable.
76
 
 This targeting will be increasingly more effective as traceability and 
the isolation of contributions for harms are improved, including the use of 
newly emerging, enhanced technologies to identify and trace the appropriate 
wrongdoers rather than imposing the less efficient industry-wide compliance 
costs associated with most environmental laws.  With greater abilities to 
identify wrongdoers, there will be increased incentives for reputable 
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companies to prevent pollution and other harms so as to keep themselves out 
of court.  
Common law remedies undoubtedly face some obstacles to their 
capability to fully carry the lantern for environmental protection, but they 
have more merit than they have been given credit for and offer more 
possibilities than have been effectively tapped by environmental advocates.  
An economics-based approach will need to focus on developing valuation 
methods and ways to identify wrongdoers.  Valuation of harms becomes 
important because if you cannot figure out what the actual harms are worth 
then you cannot properly assess liabilities.  The compensation schemes can 
only work effectively with such valuation capabilities.  Again, this will be 
difficult but we should make every effort to make such calculations to 
facilitate these market and private enforcement opportunities.  We cannot 
make perfect the enemy of good.
77
  We need to, at the very least, try, and 
thereafter fail, before we reject.  That is the basis for the proposal discussed 
later in this Essay as well.
78
   
However, if one believes that the environment is a bit too complex for 
a common law substitution for regulation then at least these principles of 
matching responsibility with cost/liability should inform the formation of 
regulation.
79
  As stated previously, the discussion of economic principles, 
even if not leading to express adoption of the economics-based alternative, 
still has the chance of beneficially rubbing off a bit on the formation of rules.
  
Embrace Consumer and Individual Responsibility to Purchase 
Environmental Preferences 
Economics-based environmentalism also tries to maximize the 
influence of all private ordering opportunities.  For example, consumers can 
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dictate how businesses behave.  If they want businesses to improve their 
environmental practices, they can pressure them to do so.   
Ludwig von Mises has explained this power of consumers, as market 
bosses, to effectuate changes in business behavior: 
The direction of all economic affairs is in the market 
society a task of the entrepreneurs. Theirs is the control of 
production. They are at the helm and steer the ship. A 
superficial observer would believe that they are supreme. But 
they are not.  They are bound to obey unconditionally the 
captain’s orders. The captain is the consumer.80 
Consumers may need to pay (through higher prices) for the 
environmental improvements and commitments by businesses that they 
demand, but that is a superior way of identifying preferences for 
environmental goods and for assessing the costs of environmental protection 
because it imposes costs on willing market purchasers of the environmental 
gain rather than coercively and uniformly imposing costs on all members of 
society.  It is also a means for better ensuring that people truly demand, 
desire, and value these outcomes.
81
  Businesses “will supply a product that 
naturally arises in a market where consumers demand products that are 
socially responsible and are willing to pay for any additional cost for the 
production of that demanded product.”82  If adding an environmentally 
friendly element to a good or service makes the provision of those things 
more expensive, the businesses can pass on the costs to the willing and 
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  As I have stated elsewhere, “[w]hether it is a demand 
for ‘green’ and recycled toilet paper, non-GMO corn, fuel efficient vehicles, 
energy conserving appliances, or similar products, if purchasers exist, then 
the corporations will label, market, and supply these products.”84  This 
capitalizes on the economic principles of individual responsibility and 
individual choice.  In this context, consumers use their own finances to 
encourage more environmentally friendly activities. 
Consumers have substantial power.  As Mises further explains: “Their 
buying and their abstention from buying decides who should own and run the 
plants and the farms. They make poor people rich and rich people poor. They 
determine precisely what should be produced, in what quality, and in what 
quantities.”85  
If consumers truly have a demand and desire, businesses will also 
become innovative and entrepreneurial in finding new ways to offer more 
“green” products and services to their consumers out of their self-interested 
desire to gain a competitive edge.  When, however, there is a dominance of 
state-based interventionist environmental law, much of this consumer-driven 
market for environmental protection is impeded.
86
  Consumers may not know 
that they should demand such goods and services.   
These consumers are also lulled into a false security that they need 
not make such demands in the marketplace because they have an ill-
conceived notion that government will handle the task of environmental 
protection.  Businesses, therefore, see more limited opportunities to profit 
because the signals to change toward more environmentally sensitive 
behaviors are not being generated as readily by consumers.  More demand for 
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many of these environmentally friendly outputs would be generated if the 
state were to lessen its role.  If the state steps back, this kind of consumer-
driven environmentalism will have more room to operate. 
Encourage More Private Contracting as a Means of Changing Business 
Environmental Behavior 
Some fascinating new work by Professor Michael Vandenbergh 
highlights the growing use of “private environmental law” in which 
businesses’ environmental behavior is altered by the associational contracts 
they enter into.
87
   Much like the consumer-driven analysis above, 
interconnected networks and affiliations in our modern complex society 
afford innumerable opportunities for environmental preferences to be 
expressed and enforced in contracts.  I highly recommend anyone interested 
in finding private solutions to the public problems of environmental harm 
look closely at this research to see the possibilities for private ordering 
through contracts toward environmental ends.  Again, if indeed 
environmental protection is valued and desired, it can be demanded and we 
can see positive results wholly apart from requiring the state to act as an 
intermediary coercively demanding behavioral alteration. 
End Subsidies and the Misallocation of Resources 
We should also end the inefficient subsidization of both dirty and so-
called green behaviors.  There is a misallocation of resources in this society 
when the playing field is not level.  Planning and picking winners and losers 
simply does not work, and subsidies are no different than other forms of 
failed social engineering.
88
  Subsidies of every kind lead to artificial and 
inefficient allocations of resources.
89
   No planner can decide accurately what 
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activities are most valuable.  Instead, we should allow market investors to 
help set those values.  Indeed, subsidizing certain behaviors can sometimes 
have unintended negative environmental consequences.  Take, for example, 
certain farming subsidies.  Regardless of whether farming seems like a good 
thing that we should encourage, farming subsidies, according to Adler, have 
contributed to “the destruction of wetlands and species habitat, increased 
chemical use, and dramatically altered the American landscape.”90   
Other subsidies, like those for oil companies, decrease the costs of 
production and thereby lead to over-exploitation and dis-incentivize pursuit 
of alternative energy sources.
91
  If you eliminate these subsidies, you may 
eliminate waste and also actually cause businesses to start more aggressively 
thinking about alternative, less-costly means of producing energy.
92
  If you 
own a business and you are cozy and comfortable because your profit is 
guaranteed by the existence of subsidies, you are less likely to innovate.   
Other recent subsidies, like those to Solyndra and Fisker, manipulate 
the markets for alternative energy, pumping money into unproven and 
inefficient enterprises.
93
  We should end all of these subsidies – whether they 
are for green industry or black gold and Texas tea.
94
  Economics counsels 
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private investment driven by private incentives and private monitoring.  A 
real level playing field would actually more effectively encourage innovation 
and experimentation in things like alternative energy.  I contend that we 
should become equal opportunity subsidy-enders. 
Simply Work to Encourage Economic Growth 
Finally, the most prosperous nations also have the highest level of 
environmental protection and the greatest concern for environmental values.  
A variety of reasons have been stated explaining this phenomena.   For one 
thing, there are greater amounts of disposable income on the part of wealthy 
nation’s citizens so that they can afford to spend money on environmental 
protection and the preservation of environmental goods.  Other reasons 
include the greater protection of human rights and an understanding of 
incentives to conserve, the existence of property rights which limits 
overexploitation of resources, and the rule of law which allows such rights 
and decisions to be respected and enforced.
95
  Market-oriented economies use 
resources more efficiently.
96
  With more disposable income, people are 
willing to pay for environmental protection.
97
  Vibrant and free economies 
develop new technologies, including things like land sparing technologies 
(using less land for food production), synthetics that replace the need for 
natural fibers or fuels, lighter construction materials, and other efficiency-
enhancing techniques with incidental benefits to the environment.
98
 
Thus, by encouraging economic growth generally, a happy externality 
of that growth is greater concern and protection for the environment.  As a 
general matter, we should focus on improving the economy because 
environmental improvements tend to come along for the ride.   
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Intermediate Concluding Thoughts on the Mix of Economics and 
Environmental Protection in the Fourth Generation 
Economics-based approaches should be a component of fourth 
generation polycentrism.  As described earlier, by necessity, the integrationist 
multimodal or polycentric approach will require more inclusion of private 
ordering and market-driven solutions.
99
  Within this framework, if done 
honestly as described, policymakers would need to give serious credit to and 
evaluate possible economics-based tools to solve environmental problems.  
However, the risk lies in the fact that economic concerns and private ordering 
are only a non-weighted part of a polycentric approach.  There is no thumb 
on the scale, i.e. there is no preference for market solutions over others.     
There is, of course, also a risk that too many of the anti-market biases 
and bureaucratic turf protection will pervade any integrationist approach.  
When there are well-established ways and set preferences on the part of 
policymakers, coupled with a continued role for leading environmental 
activists in the formulation of policy, there is a risk that anti-market 
tendencies will nonetheless dominate the debate even if that debate is framed 
as occurring within a polycentric approach.  When you go to the polycentric 
toolbox, the economic approach may be inside but will be hidden below the 
more interventionist tools.
100
  Methods should be developed to ensure that 
these economic principles are given fair consideration. 
Because the economic approaches are not weighted or favored and do 
not have special significance or standing in the polycentric approach that 
Arnold and Gunderson describe, there is always the risk that they will be 
under-utilized or even marginalized.  My proposal is to change that situation.  
There should be a thumb on the scale in favor of economic approaches and 
then only if we see market failures and market incapacity to solve 
environmental problems should we actually turn to other tools in the 
polycentric toolbox.  This idea embraces the adaptive model proposed as the 
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foundation of the fourth generation of environmental law as described by 
Arnold and Gunderson, but with certain preferences for economics at the 
outset.  Only if you see market failures and find that the market is incapable 
of adapting to such failures do you then have cause to move to other 
polycentric approaches. 
IV. A PROPOSED RULE REQUIRING IDENTIFICATION OF MARKET FAILURE 
AND THE INCAPACITY OF MARKET SOLUTIONS 
Getting economics-based environmentalism to be taken seriously in 
the policy debate may require a procedural rule that requires that state actors 
(agencies and agency officials) study and convincingly reject economics-
based alternatives before they are allowed to proceed with any more 
prescriptive or interventionist-type regulatory approaches.  Obtaining the 
legislation, executive order, or other authority to make such a demand on 
agencies will not be easy.  The mechanics of obtaining, as well as the express 
details of, such authority are beyond the scope of this Essay.  Nonetheless, a 
discussion of the basic characteristics of this proposal follows in this Part. 
We cannot always assume that the state must act in order to protect 
the environment, as this Essay has already started to explain.  “The mere fact 
that pollution causes physical harm,” for example, “does not mean that it 
necessarily constitutes some legal wrong;”101 and the mere availability of 
state intervention does not immediately make it the most attractive alternative 
to control against harm.  The mere existence of externalities is often 
trumpeted as the reason for governmental intervention, yet that alone is 
seldom proof of a market failure.
102
  Sometimes the state does not even 
pretend to find a market failure to justify interventionist environmental 
regulation but instead proceeds on some other justificatory basis.  Other 
times, when a market failure is claimed, it is used too loosely to justify such 
intervention.  There should be a way to try to hold regulators to a verifiable 
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standard for proving their case regarding the necessity of interventionist 
approaches and justifying their choice of regulatory action. 
The prerequisite to regulation that I envision would have 5 major 
components. This filtering rule would weed out the unjustified (by economic 
terms) regulatory actions.  Before an agency may impose a new regulation, it 
would be required to take several key steps.  First, an agency should be 
required to make some determination of the existence of a market failure and 
identify it with specificity.  The proposed rule would require agencies to 
study and make certain findings – before proceeding with any rulemaking – 
not just on economic impacts of regulations but instead on regulatory 
necessity.  In forming its conclusions, an agency should also be required to 
provide evidence of market failures.  This would be in the same vein as the 
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs currently 
required at the federal level for many rules,
103
 but with more rigor and 
breadth.  The proposed filtering rule should also be considered for adoption 
at all levels of government. 
Second, the agency should be required to identify, with specificity, 
the market incompatibility with the goal set before proceeding with a non-
market or interventionist type of alternative approach to solving an 
environmental problem.  Thus, the proposal would require that an agency 
identify, specifically, an actual market failure or market incompatibility that 
absolutely requires governmental intervention before proceeding to propose 
any major rules. 
Third, the agency must study the possibility of using or creating 
market mechanisms (such as the creation and allocation of property rights in 
a resource to be protected) to achieve the environmental goal.  It may only 
proceed with a non-market or non-economics-based alternative if it 
determines that those preferred mechanisms will be ineffective and provides 
evidentiary findings for the same.  The idea of requiring an agency to 
consider creating an initial legal infrastructure for market operations is 
important.  Even where there is “market failure” perceived at first, it might be 
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correctable by the state creating and protecting market mechanisms.  The 
agency should be required to study and make findings that some market 
mechanism, not currently recognized by law, cannot be legally created to 
solve the perceived failure – such as in the governmental creation, 
assignment, or recognition of property rights.  A classic case for this role is 
with overgrazing, where the allocation of tradable property rights might 
resolve the tragedy of the commons.
104
 
If an agency can make findings in all three categories rejecting market 
approaches, then and only then would it be able to move into some other 
alternative method of state action.  That decision-making process, however, 
should not be insulated from outside review.  Therefore, the final two 
components of the proposal are designed to ensure accountability. 
The fourth component would require that these determinations be 
open to some public, external review, complete with the opportunity for 
economists to comment on (and support, question, or refute where 
appropriate) the agency’s economic determinations.  Finally, as the fifth 
element of the proposal, the agency would be required to respond to these 
comments in much the same manner (or perhaps even a more rigorous one) 
that they must respond under the Administrative Procedure Act to comments 
posed in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
105
    
In the fourth and fifth components of the proposal, an agency should 
be required to make its analysis and its conclusions public and open to 
comment with a comment period similar to that required for proposed rules 
and with obligations on the agency to respond to comments and/or adjust 
their approach in light of comments.  Only then – after having found no less 
intrusive a mechanism to achieve the desired environmental goal – would the 
agency be allowed to proceed with some other manner of interventionist or 
prescriptive regulatory approach.  At this point in the process, all of the 
principles of the polycentric and integrationist multi-modal approaches could 
be taken into account in developing the regulatory structure. 
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The difference between this proposal and the Arnold and Gunderson 
suggestion for an adaptive approach
106
 is that – at least as preliminarily 
formatted here – this proposed rule would accept that the polycentric, 
integrationist multimodality approach should be utilized but only after the 
proposal’s required analysis is complete and always coupled with a 
presumption for, and thumb on the scale in favor of, a market solution.  In 
other words, the agency would be required to truly prove the market failure 
before they could proceed to other polycentric tools.  This type of priority 
and filtering rule would add rigor to the environmental rulemaking process 
and ensure that a market solution be chosen when it can be accomplished.  
We should put the onus on those favoring state-based, interventionist, non-
market regulation to prove the necessity of it. 
This proposal has a variety of benefits.  This type of market failure 
and market alternative review would hopefully create rules with narrower 
levels of government intervention.  It would also force regulators to focus on 
objectively studying where government is needed and where market 
alternatives or soft intervention is more appropriate than hard intervention 
into the markets and human decision-making.  By doing so, we are more 
likely to get a process more tailored to the polycentric model Professor 
Arnold proposes but with a wider economic foundation at its base and fewer 
of the other tools from the box being utilized. 
It should not be surprising that I am not the first to propose a rule 
designed to sway regulation toward market solutions and to focus on 
justifying regulation by proof of market failure.
107
  Executive Order 12866, 
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” has required consideration of economic 
effects in certain agency actions since 1993, although it does not mandate 
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economically-sensitive action be taken but instead is designed to work as a 
look-before-you-leap procedural safeguard.
108
   Executive Order 12866 
review has included in its considerations the existence of market failure,
109
 
along with the completion of regulatory impact analyses for economically 
significant regulations by regulating agencies with review of those analyses 
conducted by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in 
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”).110  
In 2003, the OMB issued Circular A-4
111
 – a guidance document 
designed to aid agencies in complying with the requirements of Executive 
Order 12866.  Circular A-4 includes several sections discussing the 
importance of market failure review.  In fact, at one point the Circular 
concedes that “[g]overnment actions can be unintentionally harmful, and 
even useful regulations can impede market efficiency.”112  It continues that, 
“[f]or this reason, there is a presumption against certain types of regulatory 
action,”113 but then it proceeds to list only the most extreme types of 
regulatory market intervention like price controls, production quotas, and the 
like as those worthy of requiring some “particularly demanding burden of 
proof” in light of that presumption.114   Moreover, the Circular states that 
“[c]orrecting market failures is a reason for regulation, but it is not the only 
reason,”115 and it proceeds to list very broad categories of “[o]ther possible 
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justifications,” including as examples “improving the functioning of 
government, removing distributional unfairness, or promoting privacy and 
personal freedom.”116  There is very little governmental action that could not 
be rationalized in these “other” categories.  Thus, the words of Circular A-4 
and related executive orders start to acknowledge market failure but hedge at 
times and otherwise fail to establish strict prohibitions on regulatory behavior 
that is grounded in something other than market failure or that might in some 
ways impede market efficiencies. 
Moreover, in practice, the agencies tend to either ignore or manipulate 
this guidance in a way that favors the side of regulation over that of restraint.  
Susan Dudley, for example, has determined that the methods used to comply 
with the executive orders and Circular A-4, along with the resulting 
“cost/benefit” analyses, are problematic because “agencies do not appear to 
be approaching the problem objectively,”117 and they overstate the benefits 
while understating the economic costs because “[a]gencies have strong 
incentives to demonstrate through analysis that their desired regulations will 
result in benefits that exceed costs.”118  This last problem is, of course, one of 
the main reasons for this Essay’s proposal to subject any agency economic 
analysis to more stringent review from the public, economists, and others.  
A short-lived Executive Order 13422 made effective in 2007 also 
seemed to put the determination of market failure in a more prominent 
position by amending Executive Order 12866 and requiring that agencies 
make a finding of market failure (rather than just suggesting its 
consideration) and identify that market failure in writing before proceeding 
with certain covered regulations,
119
 although there is no indication that much 
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changed in terms of practice.  President Obama swiftly revoked Executive 
Order 13422 in his second week in office in 2009 with Executive Order 
13497;
120
 and later, in 2011, President Obama added his own stamp on 
regulatory review in Executive Order 13563 (which supplements Executive 
Order 12866 and calls for some considerations of economics-based principles 
much like those included in Executive Order 12866, but it does not mandate 
their implementation, and it adds no new references to, or direct 
consideration of, market failures).
121
  This executive order ping pong match 
has allowed each new administration to tweak the regulatory review 
provisions to fit its own agenda.  The 2003 Circular A-4 remains effective 
today, as does Executive Order 12866 as amended by Executive Order 
13563.  
Although this Essay’s proposal has some similarities with some of the 
provisions in these various executive orders and Circular A-4, this Essay’s 
proposal goes farther than these documents because this Essay proposes 
giving the economic considerations of market failures a primary role with 
rule-blocking status.  Moreover, this Essay’s proposal seeks to overcome 
some of the previously-mentioned institutional barriers to aggressive 
adherence to the concept of market failure as a realistic constraint on 
regulatory behavior. 
Furthermore, the reality of executive order ping pong counsels in 
favor of grounding a market failure filtering rule proposal in something more 
durable than an executive order, such as a statute.  Of course, statutes are 
harder to obtain given the realities of bicameralism, presentment, and the 
other hurdles of the legislative process, so securing such legislation will be 
hard but worth a try.  And even if the proposal does not emerge as an 
enforceable legal standard, perhaps simply the consideration of this proposal 
could move the conversation of the role of economics in a positive direction.  
The mere deliberation on the proposal might contribute to that fruitful 
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any new regulation is warranted. 
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dialogue discussed at the outset of this Essay and have some positive 
influence on future decision-making. 
V.  THE LIMITS OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS: INSIGHTS FROM LAW AND ECONOMICS 
In this final Part, this Essay’s analysis will focus on the roadblocks to 
any reform, no matter what direction the substance of that reform takes 
(although I will at times comment on some additional hurdles, especially in 
optics, that make economics-based approaches to environmental concerns 
even more difficult to obtain).  Here, I will discuss primarily institutional and 
interest group concerns.  What are the barriers that exist from the realities of 
institutions and the realities of interest group pressures?  This will be an 
equal opportunity critique.  Regulators, business interest groups, and 
environmental interest groups each can pose barriers to effective 
policymaking for productive, efficient, and environmentally friendly 
legislative and regulatory outcomes.  Each of these groups is incentivized to 
look out for their own independent self-interests, and, consequently, each 
may present obstacles to environmental reform no matter how you phrase the 
substance of environmental reform efforts or create the desired architecture 
for reform.  Competing interest groups are not likely to be pushing the most 
enlightened reforms but instead will favor laws that are self-serving; and 
existing regulators will be resistant to change, often pushing for reforms only 
when it expands their regulatory power and reach. 
Bureaucracy Theory 
To begin, even if the law changes in the fourth generation to give 
agencies more authority to be adaptive, they may not use it.  If we are going 
to talk about resilience as an issue for the environment, we must equally 
recognize law’s resilience as a barrier to reform.  In their work, Arnold and 
Gunderson recognize some of these limits, acknowledging that “[w]hile the 
U.S. legal system can change and adapt in theory, the system is resistant to 
change.”122  As a result of some of the resistance mechanisms and 
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preferences for the status quo that develop in legal systems, “[t]he 
maladaptive nature of law can allow, facilitate, or even mandate pathological 
choices and behaviors with respect to ecosystems.”123 Moreover, Arnold 
explains that psychological forces in the legal system sometimes favor 
unimodal approaches rather than multimodality.
124
  These forces may be 
difficult to overcome and may make improving environmental law difficult 
as well.   
Much has been said about the need for adaptation in the 
environmental law context to harness the environment’s resilience.125  The 
idea of resilience as applied in a different context may be a bad thing.  When 
applied to the ecology of political and regulatory institutions, resilience may 
be the enemy of adaptation in the legal sphere.  Let us start with the 
definition of resilience provided in one work by Professor Gunderson and 
several coauthors: “Resilience is the capacity of a system to experience 
shocks while retaining essentially the same function, structure, feedbacks, 
and therefore, identity.”126  A new adaptation model of regulation in the 
fourth generation of environmental law constitutes such a disturbance or 
shock to the existing regulatory structure to which existing systems will 
respond.  Government agencies and bureaucracies have demonstrated 
substantial capacity to resist adaptation in order to preserve their core 
functions, structure, and identity.  Yet, we do not want outmoded legal 
systems to have such resilience at the expense of progress.    
Bureaucracies and bureaucrats are self-interested.  As Ronald Reagan 
aptly stated in 1964 during one of his most influential speeches: “No 
government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. So, governments’ 
programs, once launched, never disappear.  Actually, a government bureau is 
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the nearest thing to eternal life we’ll ever see on this earth.”127  Studies have 
concluded that Reagan was correct that bureaucracies exhibit tendencies to 
perpetuate themselves – they want to preserve job security, will work to 
justify their own existence, wish to capitalize on their developed (sometimes 
monopolistic) expertise in a certain regulatory field (i.e., they are the ones 
that know all the code to the regulatory machine), wish to expand their 
budgets, hope to expand personnel and thereby gain allies, desire an ever-
broadening scope of authority, and otherwise wish to entrench themselves 
and solidify their reason for existence.
128
  None of these motivations is 
consistent with a tolerance for change, and all of these tendencies will see 
alternatives to their existence (such as through economics-based replacement 
approaches) as threats worthy of determined resistance. 
More regulation equals more work, which expands the need and 
justification for the agency and its officials.  There is seldom an incentive to 
change regulatory structure and certainly even less so to change in a way that 
shrinks the size of the regulatory apparatus.  Market-based approaches pose a 
threat to the existence of bureaucratic structures and, therefore, we should 
predict that bureaucracies will be especially resistant to the economics-based 
environmental proposals discussed here.  The bureaucrats will remain 
resilient in preserving their own existence. 
As a consequence, bureaucracies may lack adaptive capacity and will 
develop resistance mechanisms so that they can remain resilient to the 
emerging environmental reforms, especially if those reforms threaten the role 
(or even continued survival) of those agencies.  Arnold and Gunderson 
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recognize this possibility in their work as well, explaining that some scholars 
have identified a “bias in environmental law to protect presumed static 
economic efficiencies and to ignore dynamic relationships between 
economics and the environment,”129 concluding that “[a]t times, the legal 
system seems to operate as if its primary function is to promote the resilience 
of the legal system itself.”130 
William Niskanen and other economists and political scientists are 
not alone in recognizing this general human tendency and validating this 
observation.  In addition to Ronald Reagan mentioned above, take just one 
other, offbeat example.  Internet technology expert Clay Shirky set off a buzz 
of discussion throughout the tech world in 2010 after uttering the words: 
“Institutions will try to preserve the problem to which they are the 
solution.”131 He was not speaking about government bureaucracies,132 but the 
point is powerful all the same.  This issue is really about tendencies in human 
nature.  The point is that, if problems are solved or actions done more 
efficiently through an alternative to the status quo, there will be less need for 
those currently tasked with solving the problem.  Indeed, their usefulness 
may entirely disappear if the problem is completely eliminated.  Thus, they 
need to find a way to hang on and for the problem to persist.  Market 
innovators have no such impediment and gain no benefit from stagnation or 
perpetuation of inefficiencies.  Their power lies in profit, innovation and 
progress, not in position. 
Even if agencies begin to talk about adaptation, coordination, 
collaboration, and the like, observers should be ever vigilant in examining 
whether their actions support the labels given the realities of the institutional 
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incentives to remain resilient against change. Bureaucratic tendencies also 
create incentives toward subterfuge and administrative masking.
133
   
Regulators are capable of masking their regulations with lots of nice 
sounding words of adaptability and polycentrism or integrationist 
multimodality; but behind the curtain may lie things which advance only 
their own interests.  If, indeed, we believe that current regulators may have 
hard-wired resistance to these types of changes, they may mask their 
activities in the new generation’s accepted vocabulary but in reality be 
working against those very same adaptive efforts.  We will need to develop 
ways to evaluate whether there is actual substance behind agency claims 
when they supposedly say that they are accepting a new regulatory paradigm.  
The regulators may be adapting their terminology to appease those advancing 
a fourth generation agenda while nonetheless remaining entrenched in old 
thinking and continuing to implement policy in outmoded ways. 
There is no reason to believe just because we decide adaptive and 
polycentric approaches are superior that bureaucracies will buy in and adapt 
with us.  The challenge remains to find a way to overcome these barriers.  
The best approach is to remove bureaucracies from holding regulatory power, 
thereby cutting off their capacity to interfere, through their resistance, with 
change or adaptation.  Markets and private ordering do not operate with 
bureaucratic agents. 
Public Choice and Interest Group Theory 
Public choice theory (also referred to as interest group theory) posits 
that private advantage – accomplished through rent-seeking behavior – is 
regularly at play in the creation of law generally, including in the enactment 
of legislation and promulgation of regulation.
134
  Environmental protection 
laws may appear to be in the “public interest,”135 and for a long time scholars 
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did not seriously question the motivations behind seemingly public-interested 
legislation.
136
  Public choice theory, however, exposed the fallacy of this 
romantic notion of lawmaking,
137
 explaining the incentives and economics 
behind the bargains that could be struck between legislators and interest 
groups. 
So, through public choice theory, we see the production of legislation 
as the creation of a commodity offered for sale to the interest group willing to 
pay the most for its production.
 138
  It is a marketplace for legislation.
139
 
Society is not the target beneficiary.  Instead, the interest groups are able to 
concentrate particularized benefits upon themselves while often dispersing 
the costs in a largely unnoticeable way to the taxpaying society as a whole.   
I have discussed in some detail the public choice analysis of 
environmental group behavior in past work.
140
  I will only briefly outline a 
few of those conclusions here.   
The interest group theory demonstrates obstacles to any fourth 
generation reform.  These were indeed already obstacles in every generation 
before as well and are not anything unique to this generation’s reforms, but 
because these barriers remain as components of our regulatory and legislative 
structure, we need to continue to remain cognizant of them as we evaluate the 
prospects for any emerging reforms. 
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Environmental groups act in the same economically rational ways as 
businesses and others – they wish to maximize their own self-interests as 
organizations and the self-interests of their members.  The environmental 
cause is often seen as a worthy one, and environmental interests groups have 
used that optic to obtain self-interested legislation that advances the groups’ 
purposes.
141
  Despite the perception on the part of many in the public that 
such sympathetic legislation is in the public interest, recent scholarship has 
focused on the interest group politics involved and found the environmental 
lobby indistinguishable from typical big business special interests when it 
comes to playing the interest group bargaining game in front of a 
legislature.
142
   Environmental interest groups manage the system for self-
interested gain just like any other interest group, obtaining benefits at a lower 
cost than would be paid if they were required to purchase the outcome in an 
open market – the very definition of rent-seeking.143    
Environmental groups seek to maximize their own budgets, increase 
dues-paying members, and obtain greater charitable contributions within a 
competitive philanthropic giving and non-profit-receiving financial 
environment.  To do so, environmental groups try to show “wins” and 
“success stories” that they can sell to the outside world in return for more 
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funding, prestige, and relative power and influence.  Quite often, these 
successes manifest themselves in tangible, saleable forms when they obtain 
regulations, win in litigation, shut down a business or in some other way 
strike a blow to the perceived enemy, or otherwise work to increase state-
based environmental controls.  These types of successes are actually easier to 
prove and causal influence is more easily demonstrated than with whatever 
likely attenuated contribution such groups can claim when the environment 
gets better.   
The point is that, as interest groups, traditional environmental groups 
might support regulations that may not be the optimal choice for the 
environment but instead will represent a competing self-interest of the group.  
Similarly, businesses too will lobby for measures that accrue to their benefit 
regardless of whether those measures are objectively efficient or otherwise 
beneficial for the environment.  We may get regulation that the businesses 
want or what the environmental groups want but neither is likely to be what 
an objective and selfless environmental advocate might believe is the best 
approach, no matter what that might be. 
This point did not escape Arnold in his work when identifying the 
best approaches in the fourth generation of environmental law.
144
  The next 
generation will not be immune from these political realities that have loomed 
over all that have come before. 
Capture Theory 
As a final example of a potential barrier, we must worry about 
whether regulators are captured by any of these interest groups and unable to 
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make objective decisions as a consequence.  An agency may be beholden to 
groups that have not bought into the changed approaches being advanced by 
fourth generation environmental law advocates.  Agencies may be incapable 
of adapting because they have been captured by certain interest groups.
145
  
Absent some major structural reform, this is a debilitating tendency that 
limits realistic chances of sound adaptation (even if possible). 
* * * 
These institutional realities were informed by the economic analysis 
of decision-making bodies and processes.  That is the other role for 
economics in the fourth generation of environmental law (as it is for all of 
law).  Economics will continue to help us understand the ways things actually 
work once human action is required, whether it be in the formulation or the 
implementation of legal rules.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is hope that economic principles will have a greater role to play 
in the fourth generation of environmental law.  Economics-based alternatives 
to state interventionist environmental laws and policies should be given a 
weighted place in any combined approach utilizing polycentrism or 
integrationist multimodality.  But, even if an economic approach does not 
rise to that level, there should at least be some room for inclusion of these 
principles into the formation of the next generation’s environmental strategy. 
The second, more pessimistic lesson of this Essay is that, no matter 
what approaches are adopted, we must keep economic principles in mind to 
the extent that they explain some of the institutional barriers to achieving any 
substantive reform for objectively good environmental ends.  The political 
and institutional realities might make any reform – no matter what direction it 
comes from – difficult because of the incentive structures built into the 
administrative agencies and in the production of legislation. 
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So what role should economics play in the fourth generation of 
environmental law?  Economic principles should, to the greatest degree 
possible, inform the content of legal rules.  Economics also has a role to play 
in providing a realistic assessment of the institutional realities and roadblocks 
to any reform.  Using economic analysis in each of these areas of analysis 
will help move the next generation of environmental law in a more informed 
and positive direction. 
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